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RIGHTS FOR CANADIAN MEMBERS OF
INTERNATIONAL UNIONS UNDER THE (U.S.)
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT
Alan Hyde*
The president-elect of Local 419 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters pleads guilty to a criminal charge of stealing $200,000 worth of
goods from a Teamster-represented warehouse. Nevertheless, the president
takes office and serves his term, along the way seeing that the candidate he
defeated is blacklisted from employment in the industry and thus loses his
Teamster membership and right to run again for office. '
The independent-minded president of Local 1005, United Steelworkers
of America, is tried before a local trial committee, composed of his
political opponents, on the charge of refusing to read at an earlier meeting a
previous set of charges against him. Convicted of this momentous charge,
he is suspended at a poorly-attended membership meeting not only from
office but from membership as well. Subsequent, better-attended meetings
attempt to undo the suspension, but the International maintains they are
unable to do so.2
*Associate Professor, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, School of Law-Newark. A.B.,
Stanford 1972, J.D., Yale 1975.
Copyright 1986 Association for Union Democracy, Inc.
This study was prepared at the request of the Association for Union Democracy, Inc. The conclusions
are those of the author. The author acknowledges with gratitude the comments of Herman Benson,
Arthur L. Fox II, Terry Fraser, H.J. Glasbeek, Michael Goldberg, James K.A. Hayes, Brian A.
Langille, Clyde Summers, and Paul Weiler, and the extraordinary research assistance of Anita Raby at
the University of Michigan and Robert Carroll at Rutgers. The usual exculpation applies fully but is
probably unnecessary; anyone who knows any of my reviewers can imagine how much he disagreed
with which parts of the study.
Ted Stein assisted the author in the early stages of this project, suggesting many helpful analogies and
lines of inquiry. He did not live to see the final product, which would have been very much better had
Ted been able to read it. Nevertheless, in gratitude for Ted's help, and for all he meant to me, this article
is humbly dedicated to his memory. It is only one of scores of articles, to be published by many authors
over the next decades, which will be less good than they might have been had Ted been able to offer his
insight and support.
When someone you love goes your life isn't ruined, it can be only very rarely that you are broken-
hearted, but life afterwards is different. You can never quite replace those friends. There are others
but they are not those. How marvellous the absolute distinctness of every human being-this
surely the most incredible thing in life.
Hugh Walpole, in his journal (June 1925), as quoted in R. HARr-DAvIs, HUGH WALPOLE: A BIOGRAPHY
261 (1952).
1. Trouble at the Top in Teamsters Local, Toronto Star, Dec. 18, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
2. Dispute in Ontario Steel Local 1005, Union Democracy Review No. 39, Mar. 1984, at 7. For
some background, see Millar, Book Review, 14 LABouR/LE TRAvAIL 236 (1984) (reviewing B.
FREEMAN, 1005: POLMCAL LIFE IN A UNION LOCAL (1982)). The president was reinstated to his
membership and office, Taylor v. Atkinson, 6 Can. Cas. Empl. L. 112 (Ont. H.C. 1984), but was
subsequently defeated for reelection.
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At a convention of leaders of building trades unions, the national
leadership presents a booklet prepared by themselves and employer lead-
ers, laying out a menu of contract concessions. A business manager in the
Sheet Metal Workers attacks the booklet as "garbage" and a danger to the
unions' position in future bargaining. The convention votes by a large
majority to disapprove the booklet. Nonetheless international leaders in the
Sheet Metal Workers charge the business manager with disloyalty and
slander. Under the union constitution this exposes him to possible loss of
his position or even expulsion from the union and exclusion from all union
work. 3
In none of these cases did the affected employees hie off to the United
States District Court and sue the Teamsters, Steelworkers, or Sheet Metal
Workers to redress these apparent violations of the Bill of Rights of
Members of Labor Organizations. 4 Why not? The short answer is simple.
The affected unionists in each case were Canadian members of so-called
"international" unions, unions with headquarters in the United States and
members in both the United States and Canada. This article addresses the
question of whether the short answer makes sense; whether, in other words,
Canadian members of international unions based in the United States
acquire any rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA) which they can enforce in the courts of the United States. 5 It
3. Probe Needed to Save Democracy in Labor, Unionists Say, Toronto Star, Jan. 22, 1986, at A8.
col. I.
4. Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959
(LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1982).
5. This article is limited to the question of rights which a court of the United States might enforce. It
does not examine any rights which a Canadian unionist, victimized by an unfair disciplinary proceed-
ing, might have under Canadian law. Canadian law governing the union-member relation is rich and
complex. and I am far from comfortable with any but the briefest discussion here. For a hornbook
introduction, see G. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT 770-861 (1985).
As a general matter, it appears that a Canadian unionist may have a cause of action to enforce rights
under the union's own constitution or by-laws, a suit conceptualized in Canada as in the United States as
a suit for breach of contract. Orchard v. Tunny, 8 D.L.R.2d 273 (Ont. H.C. 1957). Second, the unionist
may have a common law action to secure "natural justice" from an institution, here the union,
performing "quasi-judicial" functions. On both these common law actions, see generally Bimson v.
Johnston. 10 D.L.R.2d I I (Ont. H.C. 1957), appeal dismissed. 12 D.L.R.2d 379 (Ont. C.A. 1958);
Tippett v. International Typographical Union. 63 D.L.R.3d 522 (B.C.S.C. 1976). See also Taylor v.
Atkinson, 6 Can. Cas. Empl. L. 112 (Ont. H.C. 1984) (common law suit to enforce the union
constitution).
Statutory labor law in Canada is largely provincial. Federal jurisdiction is limited to certain federally
regulated industries such as banks and airlines. The provinces vary considerably in their regulation of
internal union affairs and generalization is useless. There generally are reporting and disclosure
requirements at least as stringent as those in the LMRDA. Some provincial statutes govern union
discipline explicitly; some do so as interpreted by the relevant labor board; some do not regulate internal
union affairs at all.
The existence of this substantial body of law raises the question of why a Canadian unionist would
have any interest in the LMRDA. In the cases with which I am familiar, there has been no "end run"
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concludes that Canadian members of United States-based international
unions may sue their internationals in United States courts for violation of
the LMRDA.
While the treatment here is academic, the underlying question is any-
thing but. This is a time of unusual ferment in the Canadian labor move-
ment, in large measure concerning the issue of Canadian nationalism and
local control. While a history of the dispute is not possible here,6 it affects
the subject of this article in at least two ways. First, at the moment in
Canada it is common for locals or other bodies to be split into factions, one
favoring ties with the United States-based international, the other favoring
local autonomy if not independence. Construction international unions
have withdrawn from the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), created a pro-
American rival Canadian Federation of Labour (CFL), and have disciplined
around Canadian labor law, no journey to America to obtain a ruling directly contradicting applicable
Canadian law. Rather, the issue has been one in which the applicable Canadian authority has been
sparse and undeveloped while in the United States a clear doctrine or indeed a specific judicial decree,
see infra note 15, governed the point.
I cannot stress too strongly that this entire article proceeds from the assumption, correct as of 1986,
that the Canadian and American law of union democracy aims at substantially similar goals with the
differences being those of emphasis. Only under these circumstances does it make sense to have an
international union, reviewing discipline imposed by a Canadian local, bound to apply both Canadian
and United States law. In such a regime of overlapping purpose, any regulatory conflicts may be dealt
with as they arise. Diligent search has failed to unearth any current situations in which the application of
the LMRDA to the Canadian activities of an international union would create any conflict with
applicable Canadian law.
This article similarly does not address the very interesting questions whether any provision of the
LMRDA might ever be enforced by a Canadian court. Fuller development of the point would have to be
by a scholar with a better "feel" than I have for the likely responses of Canadian courts. There do not
appear to be any reported cases of such a Canadian application of the LMRDA. Nonetheless, at least
three possible occasions for the application of the LMRDA by a Canadian court appear. First, in a
common law action to enforce the union constitution, the Canadian court might conclude that a clause
of the international constitution, say a prohibition on "slandering a union officer," violated the
LMRDA and was null and void under section 101(b), 29 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1982). See Note, Facial
Adjudication of Disciplinary Provisions in Union Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 144 (1981). (Clyde
Summers and Harry Glasbeek both made this point to me.) Second, the Canadian court, hearing the
actions alleging breach of contract and want of natural justice, might determine that the proper law of
the "contract" with an international union includes the LMRDA. This is a question of the domestic
choice of law rules applied by the Canadian provincial court. As a general matter, Canadian courts
determining the proper law of the contract apply "the system of law with which the transaction has its
most substantial and real connections." J. McLEOD, THE CONFLICTOF LAWS 469-88 (1983). Third, the
Canadian court, which is in no sense bound by the LMRDA, might regard it as a helpful analogy. This
has been the practice of United States courts forced to develop the common law of the relationship
between the public employee and the union composed strictly of public employees. See, e.g., James v.
Camden County Council No. 10 of the N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n, 188 N.J. Super. 251,457 A.2d 63 (1982).
(Michael Goldberg drew my attention to this case.)
6. See generally Adams, Canada-U.S. LaborLink Under Stress, 15 INDUS. REL. 295 (1976); Rose,
Some Notes on the Building Trades-Canadian Labour Congress Dispute, 22 INDUS. REL. 87 (1983);
Thompson & Blum, International Unionism in Canada: TheMove to Local Control, 22 INDUS. REL. 71
(1983).
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locals which argue against the policy of continued United States ties. The
intensity of feeling seems to have led in some cases to an increase in
antidemocratic activity, including a greater use of trials and disciplinary
proceedings against political opponents. 7 Secondly, the political debate in
Canada is in part a descriptive disagreement about the nature of the current
institution of "international unionism." Is Canadian autonomy possible
within this structure, or only by exit from it? It is hoped that inquiry into the
legal nature of the relationship between the Canadian worker and the
American union may clarify a very small portion of the larger question. 8
Apart from its practical significance to participants in current Canadian
union struggles, this article also aspires to a conclusion of interest to
scholars of international law. At first blush, the problem of this article
appears to be full of international law implications. The dread spectre of
"extraterritoriality," or "E.T." to international law afficionados-and a
word we will not encounter much in this article-seems to loom over the
problem. Faint echoes of monumental battles seem to reverberate over this
one.
I hope to show in this article that the most convincing analysis of the
problem involves no concepts or doctrines of international law whatever.
There are problems of choice of law, of personal jurisdiction, and of the
substantive law of the LMRDA. Once these are solved, however, the
underlying problem is solved too, and there is simply no scope for interna-
tional law thinking here, as traditionally defined. To be sure, some interna-
7. The statement in the text is not based on systematic analysis of Canadian union behavior, but is
merely an impressionistic account of the kinds of inquiries and complaints which the Association for
Union Democracy, Inc. has been getting from Canada.
This study was undertaken at the request of the Board of Directors of the Association for Union
Democracy, Inc. in order to obtain a better understanding of the possible application of the LMRDA so
as to better advise the Canadian unionists who have been in contact with the Association. I understood
my responsibility to be the accurate prediction of legal results, and have not attempted to advocate any
position lacking substantial support. The Association has in no way attempted to influence any
conclusions which I have drawn.
8. Obviously neither the author nor the Association for Union Democracy takes any position on the
underlying political debate whether Canadian workers should be represented by national or interna-
tional unions.
Several readers have found it hard to fathom why Canadian nationalists, feeling the brunt of union
discipline on account of their nationalism, would be able, consistent with their principles, to invoke
United States law. I can only report that such inquiries have been received. I am not a Canadian and
under the circumstances it would be particularly insensitive for me to comment on the politics of
Canadian nationalism as against the United States, an issue which obviously influences Canadian
reaction to a range of topics, even an ostensibly technical legal analysis such as this.
If I am correct in my analysis of American law, however, the most likely resolution of the legal
question is the application of the LMRDA to United States-based international unions but not to
Canadian local unions. It is not for me to say whether this outcome would be an acceptable political
result for any unionist, Canadian or American, to bring about.
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tional law scholars have themselves suggested this approach, 9 and we will
encounter cases which might perfectly well have been seen as problems in
"extraterritoriality" or "international law" which were instead analyzed as
pure problems of the choice of law. ' 0 There may be additional interest in
seeing another area worked out in which it is possible to overcome interna-
tional law thinking entirely, at the risk of making this article an unwanted
interloper at this international law feast.
Part I of this article briefly states the problem in fact and law. Part II
surveys some of the approaches which United States courts have employed
to determine the applicability of federal statutes to foreign plaintiffs or to
the foreign activities of American entities. My aim will be to canvass some
of the possible vocabulary and theoretical approaches which an American
court might invoke to decide whether to apply the LMRDA to the Canadian
activities of a United States international union. This will be done with
some faintness of purpose since, as will emerge, there has been little
borrowing from one body of statutory learning to another, let alone the
construction of anything regarding a general theoretical approach. Indeed,
the very terminology varies, and the broad question of this article will, it
turns out, be able to be phrased as either one of jurisdiction, the substantive
reach of a statute, or choice of law. " I My attention will come to rest on three
theories of the jurisdiction of a state to prescribe rules of conduct. Under
the "nationality" theory, Congress may prescribe rules of conduct govern-
ing the foreign conduct of American nationals. Under the "objective
territorial" principle, Congress may regulate purely foreign conduct which
has certain effects within the United States. Under the "choice of law"
approach, these questions of jurisdiction are simply omitted. Instead, the
court decides whether it has personal jurisdiction of the defendant and then
9. I have been particularly influenced by Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisidic-
tion, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (1983); Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust
Jurisdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial Abstention
Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INTL L. 395 (1983); Lowenfeld, Extraterritoriality: Conflict and Overlap in
National and International Regulation, 74 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 30 (1980); Note, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Law: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (1976).
10. Notably, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398
U.S. 306 (1970), discussed infra Part II.C & note 59.
11. Cf. Marcuss & Richard, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction i United States Trade Law: The Needfor
a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439 (1981) (pointing to inconsistent results under
different trade statutes, criticizing the failure of courts to adopt wholeheartedly either the nationality
principle or effects test discussed in this article, and calling for a "consistent theory" without actually
suggesting any).
It is not, by the way, obvious that a consistent theory would be valuable or feasible. I shall be arguing
that the choices are essentially legislative ones in which the court attempts an empathetic identification
with a hypothetical legislature. This is a valid descriptive and normative theory of some instances of
adjudication, which does not, however, lend itself well to rules.
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decides as a matter of substantive law what law governs the relationship
between plaintiff and defendant and whether plaintiff's cause of action is
part of that law. All of these theories are recognized and applied by the
courts of the United States. Any or all would provide a basis for applying
the LMRDA to union discipline against Canadian unionists. All turn
principally on an examination of the intent of Congress in enacting the
LMRDA.
Part III of this Article turns to the question of Congress' intent concern-
ing the application of the LMRDA to the Canadian activity of American
international unions. Although, not surprisingly, Congress did not directly
confront the problem, it will be argued that a congressional intent can be
judicially reconstructed. This congressional intent rests on three sources.
First, Congress had information about the interrelation by international
unions of their Canadian and United States activities. Second, Congress
had purposes in enacting the LMRDA. Third, Congress' general concerns,
questions, and frame of mind in 1959 permit a strong subjective sense-an
express element of the analysis of some courts-of what Congress would
have done had it been forced to confront the problem.
Based on these three sources, the article will conclude that anti-
democratic activities by an all-Canadian cast-say, the trial committee of a
Canadian local-must remain beyond the scope of the LMRDA as applied
by the courts of the United States. Among other problems, it is unclear how
an American court would acquire personal jurisdiction of the defendants. 12
However, and going beyond existing judicial applications, this article will
argue that international unions which are bound by the LMRDA must apply
that law to their Canadian as well as United States activities. Specifically,
an international which affirms discipline imposed by a Canadian local,
discipline which would have violated the LMRDA if imposed by an
American local, commits an independent LMRDA violation remediable in
American courts.
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Canada is unique in the world in having a substantial proportion of its
workforce organized in unions with headquarters in another country. 13 In a
12. Compare, however, the possibility of application of the LMRDA by a Canadian court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, supra note 5.
13. In 1983, the time of the most recent official analysis of union membership, 41.8% of Canadian
unionists were represented by international unions, 42.7% by Canadian national or regional unions,
and 15.5% by governmental employee organizations, which might also be classed as Canadian national
organizations. STATISTICS CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA
UNDER THE CORPORATIONS AND LABOUR UNIONS RETURNS ACT, PART 11, LABOUR UNIONS 18 text table I
(Cat. 71-202) (1983). The same report documents the gradual rise of Canadian national union density
1012
Vol. 61:1007, 1986
Canadian Members of International Unions
way, it is surprising that this state of affairs has not engendered more legal
conflict before, although as indicated there are signs that more conflict is
foreseeable.14 So far as I can discover, the Bill of Rights of Members of
Labor Organizations has been applied to protect Canadian unionists only
once, in an unreported district court opinion. 15 Consequently, the subject
of this article is essentially one of first impression.
and decrease in international density; for example in 1962, 66.8% of union members were in
international unions and only 21.4% in Canadian national unions. Id. at 26 figure 1. United States
observers should bear in mind that these represent shares of a growing, not shrinking, labor movement,
which as of 1984 represented 39.6% of all nonagricultural paid workers. Labour Canada, Press Release
No. 21/84 (June 26, 1984) (on file in the library of the Canadian Consulate General, New York, New
York).
The proportion of Canadian unionists in Canadian unions has risen since the last official report. The
press release referred to above, while unfortunately not presenting information permiting direct
comparison with the 1982 report, documents greater growth in the unions affiliated only with the
Canadian-only federations than in those affiliated with the AFL-CIO (there is, however, a large group
impossible to sort). Moreover, since that press release, Canadians in the United Automobile Workers
have split off to form a separate Canadian organization, following the earlier lead of the much smaller
Paperworkers, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, and International Union of Electrical Workers
(IUE). Separation of U.S., Canadian Auto Workers, 117 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 301 (Dec. 17, 1984).
The reader interested in analysis of this internationally unique phenomenon might consult two books
with opposite positions. J. CR1SPO, INTERNATIONAL UNIONISM: A STUDY IN CANADIAN-AMERICAN
RELATIONS (1967) is the leading defense of the institution, finding that it has benefited Canadian
workers. More skeptical is I. ABELLA, NATIONALISM, COMMUNISM, AND CANADIAN LABOUR: THE CIO,
THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND THE CANADIAN CONGRESS OF LABOUR 1935-1956 (1973). While Abella's
study is historical, he finds few benefits to Canadian workers in international unionism. Indeed, perhaps
the main theme of his study is the relatively shallow roots of the institution of international unionism.
However, every time a majority seemed to form to create an all-Canadian national labor movement, that
majority would in turn break apart over the issue of communism. My thanks to Brian Langille for
calling my attention to this very interesting study.
14. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
15. Boswell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 164, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2713
(D.N.J. 1981), terminated in a consent order under which the international union agreed to amend its
constitution and not to discipline members under the old clauses, which had been routinely used to
punish free speech. At the time of the consent order, three electricians in British Columbia had pending
appeals within the union from discipline imposed under the disputed sections. They had already paid
fines of $1000 each pending their appeals. When the consent order became effective, the international
union vacated the disciplinary decision of the trial board but refused to refund the fines paid. The three
British Columbians moved to intervene in the LMRDA proceeding; the original United States plaintiffs
moved to hold the international in contempt of the consent order and for other monetary and injunctive
relief; and the international moved for an interpretation of the consent order. By an unpublished
opinion, the court ordered the IBEW to refund the fines paid by the British Columbian electricians.
Based on representation by the IBEW's counsel that refunds would be forthcoming, the court denied
any contempt sanctions. The court did not technically address the issue of intervention by the
Canadians, preferring instead to grant the motion filed by the original United States plaintiffs. However,
the court indicated that: "[i]f there were no other way to bring the contempt motion before the court,
Rhodes, Yorke and Duffy [the British Columbia electricians] would have been permitted to intervene
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) for purposes of making the motion." Boswell v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 164, No. 79-2571, slip. op. at 7 n.1 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 1982).
The issue of extraterritoriality was expressly reserved in Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 628 F.2d 826, 831 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981), where the court enjoined an international union from
1013
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II. BASES FOR UNITED STATES JURISDICTION OVER A
CANADIAN NATIONAL'S SUIT AGAINST AN
INTERNATIONAL UNION: ANALOGIC THEORIES AND
VOCABULARIES
Let us hypothesize a suit of the following character. The plaintiff is a
Canadian national and member of an international union such as the
Teamsters, Steelworkers, or International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers. The plaintiff alleges that he has been disciplined by his Canadian local
for reasons, or in a manner which violates the LMRDA. For example, he
has been disciplined for exercising free speech, criticizing union of-
ficials, 16 or advocating disfavored political ideas. 17 Alternatively, the trial
board consisted of his political opponents, 18 or lacked any evidence sup-
porting its finding of guilt. 19 He has appealed the conviction to the interna-
tional union, but without obtaining a reversal. He now sues the interna-
tional union of which he is a member, in the federal district court for the
district in which the union maintains its principal office. 20 The union will
presumably move to dismiss the member's suit, and the judge will presum-
ably ask herself or himself in any event: "Do I have to hear this thing?"
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the answer to that
question must be: "Yes, if Congress intended you to." This conclusion is
not supposed to be controversial. It is often stated by American courts with
an air of stating uncontroversial truth that they must hear cases which
Congress has lodged with them even if Congress' decision to do so violates
acting under a clause of its constitution, but construed the decree as reaching only discipline against
United States unionists so as to avoid the question of whether the injunction might reach discipline
against foreign unionists.
16. Petramale v. Local 17, Laborers Int'l Union, 736 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
593 (1984); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
17. Turner v. Air Transport Lodge 1894, 590 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 442 U.S. 919
(1979).
18. Goodman v. Laborers Int'l Union, 742 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1984); Semancik v. United Mine
Workers Dist. No. 5, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972).
19. Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 320 F.2d 576, 578-79 (2d Cir. 1963): accord
International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 245-46 (1971) (dictum).
20. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
I have chosen a hypothetical suit under Title I simply because under that title the affected union
member sues directly, and thus frames the suit herself. The remarks should apply equally to individual
actions to enforce Title III (trusteeships) or Title V (fiduciary obligations of officers).
Title III (trusteeships) may be, and Title IV (union elections) must be enforced by the United States
Department of Labor. The Deparment's position since the LMRDA was enacted has been that the Act
applies to the conduct of United States-based international unions when they impose a trusteeship on a
Canadian local, 29 C.F.R. § 451.6(c), or when they conduct an election in which Canadians vote. 29
C.F.R. § 451.6(b). There has been little action under these regulations, however, and Department
policy might change, so for simplicity I have chosen to discuss a hypothetical action under Titles I, Ill,
or V.
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international law.21 (By contrast, in Part III, I will argue that Congress
intended federal courts to apply the LMRDA to actions by an international
union toward a Canadian member; this conclusion is concededly arguable.)
Nevertheless it is worth establishing with care the supremacy of congres-
sional intent, as established in the context of other statutes, for two reasons.
First, one suspects that a normal judicial reaction will be: "This stuff all
happened in Canada. It doesn't belong in this court." It is important to
show that the first sentence uttered by the judge does not imply the second.
Second, it should be obvious that "congressional intent" is going to turn
out to be a term of art. So as we watch courts establishing that the answer to
their question is something denominated "congressional intent," we can
conveniently also observe, legal-realist style, what evidence and assump-
tions have guided the search for congressional intent as to other statutes.
The well-counseled plaintiff will argue that at least three theories sup-
port the application of the LMRDA to the situation described. First, he will
argue a "nationality" theory: that the LMRDA applies to regulate the
activities of the unions to which it applies as American nationals, regard-
less of where those activities are carried out. Second, he will argue an
"objective territorial" or "domestic effects" theory: that the LMRDA
applies because of the effect the union's antidemocratic activity in Canada
will have on the political life of United States locals. Third, most simply
and directly, he will argue that he is a member of the International and is
suing to require the International to follow a statute by which it is bound
under choice of law rules. All of these theories of jurisdiction boil down to
the question of the substantive intent of Congress in enacting the LMRDA.
As stated, I believe that the third is much the simplest and most convincing,
and believe that the hypothetical federal district court will think so, too.
However, nothing is certain and therefore the nationality and objective
territorial theories also will be surveyed.
21. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Co. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Friendly, J.) ("If Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the United
States, even one going beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations law, a United States court
would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945)
(L. Hand, J.). This is another way of putting the point that the United States subscribes to a "dualist"
theory of the relationship between international and municipal law, under which the former is not
supreme in domestic courts. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
33-34 (3d ed. 1979).
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A. Regulatory Jurisdiction Over American Nationals Abroad:
Analogies from Trade Regulation
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe the law relating to the foreign
activities of its own nationals. 22 Let me illustrate the principle with a strong
hypothetical before turning to its rather less exciting actual applications. In
theory, Congress could write a code of conduct covering the activities
abroad of American multinational corporations. Whatever the code's status
in international law, and however foreign governments might complain,
American courts would be bound to enforce it.
The nationality jurisdiction principle has been recognized by the Su-
preme Court in cases regarding the obligation of American citizens perma-
nently domiciled abroad to respond to the subpoenas of a United States
court2 3 or to pay congressionally-imposed tax on income received from real
property located abroad.2 4 An interesting and fruitful line of cases applies
this principle to regulate certain unfair trade practices carried on by
Americans in foreign countries, even if no domestic consequences of their
activity can be demonstrated. This is obviously an important analogy to the
plaintiffs in our hypothetical case, who may similarly wish to argue that the
LMRDA is Congress' attempt to regulate unfair practices found in Ameri-
can unions, wherever the unfair practices were carried out, and however
speculative their domestic effects.
The seminal Supreme Court case, Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 25 is not
unambiguous. It relies largely on the American nationality of the regulatee,
but there were also some domestic consequences of his illegal activity, and
both aspects of the case have been fruitful of subsequent decisions. An
American citizen and resident assembled and sold in Mexico watches
bearing a spurious trademark. This was found to be trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition under United States law. Great stress was laid
on the defendant's American nationality. "Congress in prescribing stan-
dards of conduct for American citizens may project the impact of its laws
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. . . .Resolution of
the jurisdictional issue in this case therefore depends on construction of
exercised congressional power, not the limitations upon that power it-
self. ", 26 How did the Court conclude that Congress had intended to "project
the impact of its laws"? The Court's conclusion rested on three bases. First,
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30(I) (1965),
RESTATEMENT. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 402(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6.
1985).
23. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932).
24. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54-56 (1924).
25. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
26. Steele, 344 U.S. at 282-83.
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the Court considered Congress' general purposes in regulating trademark
infringement and unfair competition. Second, the Court found some slight
effects on American commerce: some components for the watch were
purchased in the United States, and some of the spurious Bulovas found
their way back into the United States. Third, a contrary decision would have
created the possibility of a foreign sanctuary for conduct illegal in Amer-
ica.27 Even more important, perhaps, though the Court did not discuss it,
may have been the fact that the plaintiff, victim of the unfair competition,
was an American corporation.
Steele is frequently cited on almost any issue relating to American
statutes and foreign conduct; most of the subsequent cases in this and the
next section of this article cite Steele. It has rarely been necessary to
determine whether Steele is primarily a case of regulating foreign conduct
because of its domestic effects, or because of the nationality of the reg-
ulatee. There have been attempts to treat Steele as a domestic effects case.28
This seems to me to be the less sound reading of Steele, for three reasons.
First, as we shall see in the next section, founding prescriptive jurisdiction
over foreign conduct on the basis of its domestic effects is less firmly
established even in American law than is jurisdiction based on nationality.
"Effects" jurisdiction is horribly problematic in international law, where
nationality jurisdiction is well-established. It makes little sense to read
Steele so as to rest on a less firm basis. Second, the "domestic effects"
reading of Steele does violence to its language. Once Steele is read as a case
of jurisdiction on the basis of domestic effects, the fact that defendant is an
American national is of no importance whatever. Under the domestic
effects theory, one can reach foreign infringement by foreign nationals of
United States-registered trademarks on the basis of sales lost to the United
States plaintiff.29 This may be a good thing to do, and for this purpose the
doctrine of jurisdiction on the basis of domestic effects should be used, as
discussed in the next section. Steele, however, laid great stress on the
American nationality of the defendant, and something must have been
meant by it. Third, Steele has not been applied to a foreign defendant, in a
case in which the court expressly refused to look at the domestic effects of
27. Id. at 285-87.
28. American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983),
enjoins infringement of a United States-registered trademark by a United States cooperative where all
the acts of infringement took place in Saudi Arabia and none of the products ever came back to the
United States. What the court described as the key fact, however, was what I described as the unstressed
fourth fact in Steele: the victim of the unfair competition, the one whose sales were lost because of the
trademark infringement, is American. This fact permitted the court to find "domestic effects" even
where no infringing products entered American commerce. Id. at 414-15.
29. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 426-29 (9th Cir. 1977)
(including Steele with the cases on objective territoriality described in the next section).
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the foreigner's infringement. 30 This was the wrong approach if Steele is just
another "domestic effects" case. It was the correct approach however if
Steele represents a different approach, that is, the exercise of jurisdiction
over American nationals abroad.31
If I am right, then, an American, simply by virtue of being an American,
may not go into a foreign country and infringe American trademark laws,
even if the mislabeled product stays abroad and even if the sales deflected
are not from American manufacturers. At least this conclusion is consistent
with all the relevant cases and inconsistent with none. 32 It is certainly a
conclusion pregnant with possibilities for our plaintiffs in the hypothetical
suit, for it opens up the analogous conclusion that Congress may similarly
have intended that American-regulated unions not be able to break Ameri-
can union regulations in a foreign country. But is not the conclusion a
startling one? It is said to rest on Congressional intent. Why might Con-
gress have intended to make Americans carry unfair trade laws around with
them?
The question must be answered if the strength of the analogy from
trademark law is to be evaluated. Unfortunately the answer must be spec-
ulative. The cases do not reach very far to find congressional intent beyond
the vaguest generalities about the purpose of the legislation. Some spec-
ulative answers are plainly too broad and must be rejected. The courts are
unwilling to impute to Congress any concern for the welfare of foreign
consumers, Arabian rice eaters, or Panamanian whiskey drinkers. 33 Nor is
Congress likely to be concerned with the overall morality, the soul as it
were, of American marketing personnel. Congress could legislate a moral
30. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
871 (1956).
31. The approach suggested in the text was adopted in Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling
Co., 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973), where the court enjoined the placing of false labels by an American
bottler on spirits bottled and distributed in Panama. This is the same result as was reached in American
Rice, discussed supra note 28, but the theoretical basis is different. The Scotch Whisky holding does not
rest on damage to American manufacturers; the plaintiffs represented distillers in Scotland and their
very complaint was that the Panamanian bottles didn't contain enough of what had been produced in
Scotland. Nor does the holding rest on lost American sales, except fora small quantity in the then-Canal
Zone. Rather, the theoretical basis is squarely jurisidiction over nationals: "No principle of interna-
tional law bars the United States from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or
even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed. . . .The
question is whether Congress intended the [Lanham] Act to apply .... " Id. at 812.
32. See also Branch v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944) (Minton, J.),
wherein the court enjoined an American from marketing phony "diploma mill" correspondence
courses in Latin America: "Congress has the power to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign
commerce by citizens of the United States, although some of the acts are done outside the territorial
limits of the United States."
33. American Rice, 701 F.2d at 414; Branch, 141 F.2d at 35.
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code for all Americans acting abroad, for the image of the nation and the
welfare of mankind. But Congress hasn't done so, and Lanham Act viola-
tions cannot be seen as the first installment of such a code.
Let me suggest three possible explanations for the surprising Lanham
Act result. First, express in Steele, is the "foreign sanctuary" concern. We
shall encounter this concern again when it comes to the marketing of
fraudulent securities. Some activities, here marketing, are highly mobile,
and it makes little sense to impute to Congress a regulatory scheme which
the American regulatee can so easily evade by a move across the border.
This concern has slight application only to the problem of union democracy
law.34 The second concern may be called: "What goes around, comes
around." That is, the Lanham Act cases may be domestic effect cases with
a presumption of domestic effects. People who go abroad and do unsavory
things on our small interconnected planet will debase the standards of trade
at home over time, in a sort of Gresham's law effect. The third concern may
have to do with the concept of registering a trademark as a sort of a promise,
even when made to foreigners such as distillers of Scotch whiskey. Our
government has told people that it will protect their trademarks. As a
practical matter, it can't do so everywhere and anywhere, nor should it try.
But when the skunk is an American, and we can get him, we will, to protect
the promise we have made in registering trademarks.
The latter two arguments should suggest union democracy analogies.
First, shady union practices across our northern border will inevitably
erode standards at home. Second, the LMRDA is a sort of governmental
promise or commitment to union members to enforce certain standards on
American institutions which may affect foreign citizens as a result of their
decision to join United States-based unions. In Part III of this article I hope
to show that these and related arguments provide a considerably more
impressive basis for the conclusion that Congress intended the application
of the LMRDA to international unionism in Canada, than anything the
courts have come up with to support the similar conclusion under the
Lanham Act.35
34. Unions could make it an issue if they denied being American nationals for purposes of
international law. If unions were to assert that they flew entirely under flags of convenience, like
merchant ships, they might, however, open up the possibility of applying United States law to prevent
unions escaping any regulation.
35. There are of course cases in which the courts find that an American acting abroad is not bound
to observe American law. These cases also rest on congressional intent. No one doubts that Congress
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B. Regulatory Jurisdiction Over American Conduct for Foreign
Plaintiffs or Over Foreign Conduct with Domestic Effects:
Analogies from Antitrust and Securities Regulation
It is well established that federal courts will on occasion act against
conspiracies in restraint of trade or the marketing of fraudulent securities,
even where all or most of the conduct was carried on by foreigners in
foreign jurisdictions, because of the domestic effects of the conduct. This is
known, obscurely, as the "objective territorial" principle of jurisdiction,
and the classic example-not, as far as I can discover, based on an actual
case-is the gunman in jurisdiction A who fires on and kills someone in
jurisdiction B, thereby subjecting himself to the criminal jurisdiction of
each locale. The law review literature is extensive-other epithets come to
could have made its law applicable to the conduct in question, and these cases all say so expressly. The
conclusion is simply that Congress didn't so choose. The leading Supreme Court case employs a rather
strong "canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, [which] is a valid
approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained. It is based on the assumption
that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions." Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949) (refusing to apply the Eight Hour Law to labor performed by an American citizen for an
American contractor working for the United States military in a foreign country). As a statement of a
general approach this is rather the low water mark of the nationality jurisidiction theory. It is impossible
to square with later cases such as Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), discussed supra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text (which nevertheless cites the presumption). Indeed, some of the
justices felt that the case could not be squared with earlier cases either, notably Vermilya-Brown Co.,
Inc. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) (applying Fair Labor Standards Act to United States military base
leased on Bermuda). See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 291 (concurring opinion). David Currie has stated
that the presumption of territoriality, "loudly and unnecessarily proclaimed by Mr. Justice Holmes, has
been an albatross which the [Supreme] Court has struggled to remove ever since." Currie, Flags of
Convenience, American Labor, and the Conflict of Laws, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 57.
More recent cases in the lower courts refusing to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of American
nationality, while typically citing Foley Brothers, do not actually rest on that presumption, but go
considerably farther to find congressional intent. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1375 (1982), does not prohibit
a United States citizen from taking dolphins within the territorial waters of a foreign sovereign state,
resting on a tradition of negotiation between states directly on these matters; geographic references in
the statute limited to the United States and the high seas; a permit system which did not seem to
contemplate extraterritorial application; and a legislative history which referred to foreign seal hunts
but only in the context of banning imports, not regulating American hunters); Airline Stewards &
Stewardesses Ass'n Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, 273 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
988 (1960) (Railway Labor Act does not require American carrier to bargain with hostesses and
stewards not nationals of United States, all based abroad and used exclusively on flights outside the
United States; resting on descent of Act from Interstate Commerce Act which in turn speaks of
transportation which "takes place within the United States").
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mind-and for present purposes we need hit only the high points. 36 This
theory is obviously less useful to our hypothetical plaintiffs than the
previous one-the "American nationals" theory-particularly when the
two are interrelated. If the respondent in the hypothetical case is not an
American national, for example a Canadian local or district, American
domestic effects of the local's antidemocratic conduct will be hard to
demonstrate. The principal interest of the antitrust and securities cases for
our problem lies, it seems to me, in the method used by the courts to divine
the "congressional intent" which assertedly is effectuated when jurisdic-
tion is found, because once again the decision by an American court to
assert objective territorial jurisdiction is supposed to be solely because
Congress ordered it to do so.
Let me give a few of the leading examples of this sort of statutory
application, at the risk of bogging down in a well-ploughed field, before
trying to figure out whether they stand for any general theory of statutory
interpretation. The leading case, both as to result and, as we shall see, as to
judicial method, is United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).37
Almost everything which has followed has been an attempt to come to
terms with this great opinion by a great judge, Learned Hand. 38 We are here
concerned with the portion of the opinion dealing with a cartel of aluminum
36. The law review literature on the application of United States antitrust laws to foreign conduct is,
in the opinion of this author, the largest and worst body of law review literature with which I am familiar.
If you don't want to take my word for it, take the word of the compiler of a recent "selective
bibliography" which nevertheless runs on for over twenty pages. "Although the literature on extrater-
ritorial application of United States antitrust law is voluminous, its ideas are few and its repetitiveness
great. The same propositions are advanced year after year with little noticeable effect one way or the
other." Hood, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws: A Selective Bibliogra-
phy, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765, 767 (1982).
The articles fall into two general classes. Descriptions of legal principles actually applied in the
cases, almost never going beyond the language of the cases themselves, are common; in these articles
analysis of or even reference to economic, social, or any other values is completely absent. The other
class consists of protests against the exercise of American jurisdiction, typically made by foreign
officials or by American counsel to foreign enterprises and, while found in law reviews, of the general
intellectual caliber of a bar association luncheon address (which many of these articles also were). I read
dozens of these articles in order to prepare for this one. I would not wish the experience on anyone; I
refuse to cite them, except where I am citing an idea not found in all the other articles.
37. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The case has been described as the "first major case in which a
court in this country applied a United States law to activities by noncitizens outside this country without
an expressed congressional directive." Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A
Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1010 (1976).
38. It is thus amusing to note the possibility that there never was any foreign conduct in the Alcoa
case, or in any event that Judge Learned Hand did not believe that there was. He dropped numerous hints
to his own predilection that the nominally Canadian company, Aluminum Limited, was both function-
ally at one with the American firm Alcoa and, even if viewed as independent, essentially an American
enterprise. The trial judge had found to the contrary, however, and a reversal of these factual findings
would have raised the possibility of additional hearings. Trial of the case had already consumed t wo
years and resulted in 40,000 pages of testimony. It has therefore been suggested that Hand's venture into
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producers, organized as a Swiss corporation with the participation of
European aluminum companies and Aluminum Limited, a Canadian cor-
poration originally founded by Alcoa and still owned largely by Alcoa's
owners, but found by the district judge to be independently operated. The
cartel violated United States antitrust laws. Hand's test would apply the
Sherman Act to foreign agreements intended to affect United States im-
ports or exports and which actually did affect them 39-the broadest of any
of the formulations essayed in the area. Why? The preparatory steps dance
to an ostinato motif of congressional intent which disappears from the score
once the pirouette actually begins.40 It is a cliche to observe that the
Sherman Act Congress could hardly have foreseen or addressed the rise of
the world economy; 41 impeccably the stylist as ever, Hand spares us even
this wan cliche. So what sort of lawmaking is going on here, and what does
Congress have to do with it?
Earlier in the opinion there is a clue both revealing and mysterious. In a
famous if currently unfashionable passage, Hand rejects Alcoa's conten-
tion that a monopoly might be permissible if it realized only the profit
which would have obtained under competition. The Act, to paraphrase
Hand, has wider purposes; competition has other benefits besides lower
prices; it may lead to innovation, energy; Congress could prefer a system of
small producers on democratic grounds. "These considerations, which we
have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions
prove to have been in fact its purposes." 42 How can the decisions prove
what were an act's purposes "in fact"?
The Supreme Court has cited Alcoa with approval and applied it to what
might seem the reverse situation, a conspiracy conducted in Canada to
the law applicable to foreign actors was an attempt to reverse an unsympathetic finding of fact. I J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 6.05, at 148-49 (2d ed.
1981).
39. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
40. Preparation:
[W]e are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the
United States of persons not in allegiance to it. That being so, the only question open is whether
Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so:
as a court of the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law. Nevertheless, it is quite true
that we are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without regard to the limitations
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally
correspond to those fixed by the "Conflict of Laws." We should not impute to Congress an intent
to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United
States.
Id. Note the three references to Congress in four sentences. By contrast, the passages actually stating
the holding are entirely unadorned by any reference to any congressional materials, legislation,
hearings, or even speeches.
41. See generally Picciotto, Jurisdictional Conflicts, International Law and the International State
System, I1 INT'L J. Soc. L. 11 (1983).
42. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427 (emphasis supplied).
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exclude an American producer from the Canadian market. This allegation
was held to state a claim under the Sherman Act and a directed verdict for
the defendant was reversed. The decision cites Steele, Alcoa, and academic
authorities. It makes no reference to any legislative materials, or anything
which could be described as policy.43
These decisions, and other artifacts of the expansive era of American
antitrust law,44 created considerable consternation in foreign business and
governmental circles and in the academy. While the doctrine of jurisidic-
tion on the basis of domestic effects, or "objective territorial jurisdiction,"
is not unknown to international law, it is controversial, and many foreign
governments do not recognize it.45 A search began for a formula to limit the
exercise of jurisdiction even in cases of conduct with domestic effects.
While no single formula has won complete adherence-indeed, as we shall
see, some courts and academic authorities still prefer Hand's simple test of
intent plus domestic effects-two are worth identifying as potentially
appealing formulas in the solution of our underlying problem. The less
successful is the approach of the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law, who recognized objective territorial jurisdiction
but only in the case of "substantial effects" which are the "direct and
foreseeable result" of the activity regulated; moreover, the antitrust viola-
tion and its effect must each be "constituent elements of the activity
regulated. ",46 This formula has not been particularly influential; as words of
limitation go these are more desperate than compelling.47
Altogether more interesting is the "comity" or "balancing of interests"
approach, in which an initial finding, or assumption arguendo, of domestic
43. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 702-08 (1962).
The Supreme Court has also expressly held that foreign plaintiffs may sue American entities in
American courts for antitrust injuries sustained. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978).
44. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
decree, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
45. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 402
comment d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
46. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
The ongoing revision simplifies this wording. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (REvISED) § 402(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
47. But see Export Trading Company Act of 1982, § 402, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a) (1982)
(excluding from the reach of the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts conduct having no
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States domestic commerce, import
commerce, or the export opportunities of a United States national). The intent of the legislation was to
clarify, not change, the prevailing judicial standard. See H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6
(1982). The legislation has not had the desired pacificatory effect on foreign governments and
enterprises as a result of simultaneous executive decisions which undercut its symbolic message. See
Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORD. L.
REv. 350, 351 (1983).
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effects is then discounted by a series of factors, expressly including comity
with other nations and international law considerations. 48 The compilation
and balancing of multiple "interests" so as to distinguish false from true
conflicts is expressly patterned on postwar choice of law theory. 49 It is
important to see that this approach borrows expressly from choice of law
theory but does not go whole hog. The court does not conceive itself as
actually making a choice of law decision on this view. Rather, it is deciding
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, and, if it decides that comity and
international fairness militate against the application of United States law,
that constitutes a dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 50
The comity test is an appealing one for a court concerned about foreign
sensibilities. The factors which discount the exercise of jurisdiction include
"political" factors such as how much noise and complaining foreign
governments have made or are likely to make.51 This may make this
48. This approach was first suggested in K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD 306 (1958), where it bore the unfortunate name "jurisdictional rule of reason." The most
influential case which expressly relies on Brewster is Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. &
S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (dismissing
complaint), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985). Three circuits
have adopted essentially the Timberlane approach, and any modifications would take us too far afield
here. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir. 1982). vacated
and remanded on other grounds (standing), 460 U.S. 1007, aff'd on remand, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869, 871 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1296-97 (3d Cir. 1979); see also I J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 38, § 6.11, at 163 ("[ilt is
. . . likely that the Timberlane approach. . . will be influential if not controlling in foreign commerce
litigation for some time to come."). But see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belg. World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting the interest balancing approach, noting scholarly criticism of
the concept, and characterizing it as having "not gained more than a temporary foothold in domestic
law").
49. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American
Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586 (1961).
50. Timberlane, 749 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
Presumably the court cannot retain the case and apply foreign law, as it might if the problem were one of
the choice of law. There is a dispute, however, about whether the court must dismiss; that is, whetherthe
Timberlane doctrine is one of abstention or of subject matterjurisdiction. In Timberlane itself, the court
found that the factors of comity weighed against jurisdiction. There is a dispute whetherthis represented
abstention from exercising jurisdiction, presumably a discretionary judgment, see Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982), or whether the comity analysis is rather
part of the threshold test for exercising subject matter jurisdiction. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1299 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
51. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisidiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and
Private International Law, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 280, 283 (1982). The seven factors identified in
Timberlane as relevant to the comity analysis are: the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; the
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the location or principal place of business of corporations; the
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance; the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere; the extent to which there
is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; the foreseeability of such effect; and the
1024
Canadian Members of International Unions
approach attractive to a court hearing our hypothetical LMRDA case which
thinks that the Canadian plaintiffs have a good case on the merits but is
worried about Canadian sensibilities. It must be said, however, that there
has been little inclination in the courts to borrow doctrines and concepts
used to solve problems of extraterritoriality from one substantive law area
to another. On our underlying metaproblem of how courts justify adopting
one analysis or another, adhering to a norm of congressional intent in the
face of congressional silence, the interest balancing approach offers little
assistance. The case which originated it cites much academic, and no
legislative, authority.52
Securities regulation has also been applied to protect some foreign
investors and to restrain some foreign conduct, in each case on the basis of
the domestic effects of the conduct. A line of cases in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has developed the principles. We
may deal here only with the most recent, which addresses both problems,
as well as the metaproblem of "congressional intent," the latter in a most
frank and interesting way.53 After the collapse of the financial empire of
Bernard Cornfeld and Investors Overseas Services, foreign and American
plaintiffs sued a truly multinational cast of defelidants in an American
court, alleging causes of action under the Securities Act of 1933. The court
recognized several theories under which foreign plaintiffs could con-
ceivably proceed, only some of which were applicable on the facts. Inap-
plicable was nationality jurisdiction; the defendants could not be described
as American nationals. Securities fraud actually committed in the United
States was an easy case (raised in a companion case); anyone who pur-
chased such securities could sue in federal court, even foreigners and even
if the securities were not peddled to Americans at all. 54 The harder issue
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with
conduct abroad. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614. See also Timberlane, 749 F.2d at 1384-86. Both "conflict
with foreign governmental policy" and "obstacles to compliance" seem to stand in as measures of the
sensibilities of the relevant foreign government, particularly as used in Timberlane. See, e.g., Tim-
berlane, 549 F2d. at 614 (concern expressed with "likely sore spot[s]").
How can anyone find international law to be otherworldly or ivory tower-like? This kind of express
evaluation of political reaction makes obvious what is so often undertaken sub silentio and goes some
way in implementing the legal vision of the Critical Legal Studies movement. It goes only a little way,
because the political arguments are one-sided. Political reaction is an argument for stasis, but there is no
countervailing way in which a political argument may be made for action. Still, judicial realism about
politics is rare enough that one should encourage it when it emerges.
52. Timberlane, 549 E2d at 608-15.
53. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
Among the surveys of the area are Hacker & Rotunda, The Extraterritorial Regulation of Foreign
Business Under the United States Securities Law, 59 N.C.L. Ray. 643 (1981); Note, The Extrater-
ritorialApplication of theAntifraudProvisionsoftheSecuritiesActs, I ICORNELL INT'L L.J. 137(1978);
Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARv. L. REV. 553 (1976).
54. HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) ("We do not think Congress intended to
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was the elusive subject of this section, objective territorial jurisdiction, or
the regulation by American courts of foreign-based activity on the basis of
the latter's domestic effects. The court held the possible effects of the
foreign-based activity insufficient to support jurisdiction. If the foreign
fraud depressed domestic stock prices or involved significant amounts of
United States-based activity, a different case might be presented. Long-run
adverse effects of a speculative nature did not suffice to make the foreign
activity into American securities fraud. 55
The analogy to the LMRDA is quite direct, should a court choose to draw
it. Antidemocratic activity carried on in America, or by an American
entity, is actionable, and the foreign nationality of the plaintiff no obstacle.
If the only basis of American jurisdiction is alleged effects of undemocratic
behavior in Canada on labor relations in the United States, plaintiffs had
better be prepared to show specific effects, not just a general lowering of
standards.
Equally interesting for our purposes was the coup de grace which this
case delivered to an inconclusive series of arguments from legislative
intent. 56 Judge Friendly wrote for the court, and he was nothing if not frank
about the sources of the holdings summarized above:
We freely acknowledge that if we were asked to point to language in the
statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions,
we would be unable to respond. The Congress that passed these extraordinary
pieces of legislation in the midst of the depression could hardly have been
expected to foresee the development of offshore funds thirty years later. We
recognize also that reasonable men might conclude that the coverage was
greater, or less, than has been outlined in this opinion and in ITT [sic] v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2 Cir 1975) this day decided. Our conclusions
rest on case law and commentary concerning the application of the securities
laws and other statutes to situations with foreign elements and on our best
allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export,
even when these are peddled only to foreigners."). The court noted that this holding applied only to the
perpetration of fraud, not to mere preparatory actions or a failure to prevent foreign frauds.
55. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989.
56. Earlier cases in the Second Circuit had attempted to gloss section 30(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b)(1982), exempting from the Act certain transactions on foreign
stock exchanges. The earliest encounter with extraterritoriality, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200, 208, rev'd in part on other grounds, 405 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969), relied heavily on this section as its main legislative holding. By exempting some transactions
from the registration and reporting requirements, Congress was thought to have indicated its intent that
some aspects of the Act, namely the antifraud provisions, apply to these transactions. The later case of
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972), turned
this argument neatly onto its head. This legislative history was "of little relevance" and proved only that
the scope of the antifraud provisions was not to be guided at all by congressional action on registration
and reporting.
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judgment as to what Congress would have wished if these problems had
occurred to it.
57
Summing up then the lessons learned from our brief survey of analogous
problems under other federal statutes, we can conclude that federal courts
must entertain suits by foreign plaintiffs, or concerning foreign conduct, if
Congress intended them to do so. Where, as is typical, congressional
materials do not directly address this question, the court should study the
background of the statute so as to make an informed judgment about what
Congress would likely have wanted had it addressed the problem. This
must be decided on an issue-by-issue, statute-by-statute basis, and there is
thus little call for, say, a general theory of extraterritoriality. Some con-
clusions which courts have reached under other statutes, under appropriate
circumstances, are that Congress would have wanted the statute applied to
all conduct by American nationals; or to conduct carried out from an
American base which harms foreigners; or to conduct carried out by
foreigners in foreign countries with significant and demonstrable domestic
effects.
57. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993. Once again the international law context enables the cat to be let out of
the bag. Cf. supra note 51 and accompanying text. Of course Judge Friendly is correct, like Judge Hand
in Alcoa. When the statute is elderly, congressional revision unlikely, and express congressional
attention to the problem unlikely, what alternative is there to the course taken? On the one hand, the
court could refuse to address the problem at all until Congress tells it what to do. This could mean a long
wait for little guidance on a pressing problem. Alternatively, the court, if as self-confident as Judge
Hand or Judge Friendly, makes its best guess as to what Congress might have wanted.
This "best judgment as to what Congress would have wished" is an important but poorly understood
judicial technique. It is not-really not-the same as the judge imposing the solution she prefers on
personal grounds. It is rather an act of empathetic identification in which the judge studies the
legislative materials which exist, not to "answer the problem," but to facilitate the ability to empathize
with Congress, to understand its concerns, its fears, and the conceptual apparatus and vocabulary
which Congress brought to bear on the problem. The judge must also be self-conscious, however, since
all this learning only informs, but can never substitute for, the judge's own ultimate decision. Cf.
Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, in LABYRINTHS: SELcraD SToRMs AND OrHER
WRrINGs 36, 40 (D. Yates & J, Irby eds, 1964):
The first method he conceived was relatively simple. Know Spanish well, recover the Catholic
faith, fight against the Moors or the Turk, forget the history of Europe between the years 1602 and
1918, be Miguel de Cervantes. Pierre Menard studied this procedure (I know he attained a fairly
accurate command of seventeenth-century Spanish) but discarded it as too easy. . .. To be, in
some way, Cervantes and reach the Quixote seemed less arduous to him-and, consequently, less
interesting--than to go on being Pierre Menard and reach the Quixote through the experiences of
Pierre Menard.
Some recent work of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies suggests that this model of empathetic
identification may describe much good judging more accurately than models of following rules or
making political theory, but I cannot pursue the point here. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 624-49 (1982).
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In Part III of this article we turn to the question of what the LMRDA
Congress might have wished. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to
examine an alternative approach under which all the problems of Parts II.A
and II.B are simply avoided.
C. Jurisdiction Treated As a Problem in the Choice of Law: Analogies
from the Jones Act
The Jones Act creates a federal cause of action at law for the benefit of
seamen against their employers.58 When seamen who are foreign nationals
sue shipowners who are foreign nationals, sometimes they are not permit-
ted to sue and sometimes they are. What is interesting for our purposes is
that the relevant Supreme Court cases are utterly free of the language of
subject matter jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, comity, and the like. Assum-
ing that the foreign plaintiff has achieved valid personal service of the
defendant-not difficult in the case of an international shipowner-the
only remaining question is conceptualized as choice of law, the law
governing the relationship. 59
58. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982)).
59. The two leading Supreme Court cases are much commented and do not require extensive
treatment here. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 575 (1953), first conceptualized the problem as one
of choice of law. "A cause of action under our law was asserted here, and the court had power to
determine whether it was or was not well founded in law and in fact." The plaintiff in Lauritzen was a
Dane working on a Danish ship, the injury complained of occurred in Cuba, and the only contact with
the United States was a stop in New York at which time the seaman signed a contract of employment.
The Court held the Jones Act inapplicable. The case is today cited largely for its discussion of seven
factors relevant to choice of law in a maritime tort case, namely: (1) the place of the wrongful act, (2) the
ship's flag, (3) the allegiance of the claimant, (4) the allegiance of the shipowner, (5) the place of the
contract, (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum, and (7) the laws of the forum, particularly with
respect to the choice of law question. Id. at 583-91.
Seventeen years later in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970), the Supreme Court,
while preserving the choice-of-law approach, modified it from one of weighing factors to one of
national interest. In Rhoditis, a Greek seaman signed on a Greek flag ship in Greece and was injured in
New Orleans. The ship was owned by a Panamanian corporation, managed by a Greek corporation,
with its largest office in New York and offices in other United States cities as well, including New
Orleans. Over 95% of the stock of the management corporation was owned by an individual, a Greek
national domiciled in the United States. Thus, of the seven Lauritzen factors, four favored the
shipowner. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court (5-3) permitted suit under the Jones Act. At the narrowest
level, the Court indicated that the list of seven factors was not exhaustive, and added an eighth-the
shipowner's base of operations. Id. at 309. However, the Court cautioned against an approach of
mechanically weighing factors. Central to the Court's analysis was its perception that the defendant was
essentially "engaged in an extensive business operation in this country," id. at 310,-all of its business
involved shipments to or from the United States-and ought not to be permitted "advantage over
citizens engaged in the same business by allowing him to escape the obligations and responsibility of a
Jones Act employer."' Id. See generally Note, Keeping Up with the Jones Act: The Effect of United
States Based Stock Ownership on the Applicability of the Jones Act to Foreign Seamen, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 141 (1982); Note, Striking the Colors: Choice of Law Under the Jones Act, 21 VA. J.
INT'L L. 577 (1981).
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It is not easy to explain the different approaches to foreign plaintiffs
between the Jones Act and, say, the Securities Acts or Antitrust Acts. A
genuine and not at all cynical answer is that the Jones Act cases have not
aroused significant foreign protest. There is thus no need to have a "juris-
dictional" inquiry in which jurisdiction is discounted by factors including
foreign reaction. Perhaps the Jones Act approach is unique to that statute,
designed subconsciously to deal with the problem of defendants, ships or
shipowners, whose nationality is entirely a matter of convenience. 60 Ob-
viously, however, if the Jones Act approach is not unique to that statute, it
yields a simple analogy to our hypothetical LMRDA case. 61 The court may
simply hear the Canadian member's LMRDA case on the merits. By
hypothesis, the suit is in the federal district in which the international union
maintains its principal office, so there will be no problem with personal
jurisdiction. The Canadian will be complaining of the international's own
conduct, performed in the United States. All relevant choice of law factors
will call for the application of American law with the sole exception of
plaintiff's nationality.62
III. THE LMRDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL UNION
We have now gone a very long way around the barn to arrive where you
knew we were going: the question of Congress' purposes or intent in
60. Cutting against this explanation is the line of cases in the Supreme Court dealing with the
application of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1982), either to
foreign flag ships or to ancillary United States longshoring and stevedoring work. As to shipping, the
Court has been steadfast that the NLRA does not apply to foreign flag vessels with foreign crews, even
while the vessel is physically in an American port. Thus, most obviously, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) may not conduct an election. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). The remaining shipping cases are not about extraterritoriality or comity
at all; they are about federal preemption of state injunctive proceedings, and the only effect of holding
the ships beyond the NLRA is to permit a state or federal (admiralty) injunction against the picketing.
Windward Shipping (London) v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974); Incres SS Co. v.
International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.,
353 U.S. 138 (1957).
The longshoring and stevedoring cases are a dismal lot in which those activities are in commerce
when they can be found to be union unfair labor practices, see International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (longshoremen's refusal to handle cargo is a secondary boycott),
and are not in commerce when the state court wants to enjoin them. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile SS
Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974) (stevedoring companies may enjoin employees' strike as state tort since the
employers would be unable to get the matter before the NLRB). The neutral principle is that the union
always loses. But see International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397
U.S. 195 (1970) (longshoremen are in commerce, not enjoinable by state court, when they protest low
wages paid United States longshoremen).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
62. Not by itself disqualifying. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (antitrust laws);
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (securities laws).
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enacting the LMRDA. (The sole purpose of our journey in Part II was just
to demonstrate that we must end up with Congress' intent: there are no
methods or approaches endemic to international law which substitute for or
avoid that inquiry into Congressional purpose.) The congressional purpose
which we seek is not that specifically relating to foreign plaintiffs. However
nice it would be to find that purpose, it doesn't exist. Rather, we must
reconstruct Congress' likely attitude on the question of foreign plaintiffs
from its general purposes in enacting the LMRDA.
These general purposes are easy to identify, at least at a sufficiently high
level of abstraction. 63 "The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 was the product of congressional concern with widespread
abuses of power by union leadership." 64 The Bill of Rights of Members of
Labor Organizations placed emphasis on the rights of union members to
freedom of expression without fear of sanctions by the union, which in
many instances could mean loss of union membership and in turn loss of
livelihood. Such protection was necessary to further the Act's primary
objective of ensuring that unions would be democratically governed and
responsive to the will of their memberships. 65 "Congress adopted the
freedom of speech and assembly provision in order to promote union
democracy." 66 In the words of its congressional sponsor, the bill of rights
was to end "autocratic rule by placing the ultimate power in the hands of the
members, where it rightfully belongs, so that they may be ruled by their
free consent, may bring about a regeneration of union leadership." 67
However pleasant it would be to resolve all problems of interpreting the
LMRDA by reference to these sentiments, there is a problem with the Act's
interpretation. Intellectual honesty requires that we face the problem,
although I do not believe it will impede resolution of the rights of Canadian
unionists. The problem is the multiplicity of congressional purposes, as
seen in the tension between Congress' investigations and the ultimate
legislative product.
Briefly, Senate investigative hearings into financial corruption and mis-
dealing and organized crime infiltration of some unions and management
63. See generally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, in 73
HARV. L. REV. 855 (1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
in 58 MICH. L. REV. 819(1960); Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
in 46 VA. L. REV. 195 (1960); Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REV.
273 (1962). There is no treatise or hornbook treating the Act overall. Popular introductions from a pro-
plaintiff perspective are H. BENSON, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS FOR UNION MEMBERS (1979), and C.
SUMMERS & R. RABIN, THE RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS (2d ed. 1979).
64. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982).
65. Id.
66. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowshi, 457 U.S. 102, 112 (1982).
67. 105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959), LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, reprinted in 2 NLRB, at 1099 (1959).
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consultants 68 led to a statute requiring all unions to engage in financial
reporting and, in addition, to observe democratic internal procedures: fair
and frequent election of officers, protection of the freedom of dissent, and
fair disciplinary procedures. This mandated union democracy was, as
Clyde Summers has observed, "not directly responsive to the committee's
findings;" 69 it became law when a congressional majority could be cobbled
together, and that majority operated from sharply divergent visions. It
included sincere believers in the value of democracy and fair process even
in nominally private institutions; crime fighters who believed that demo-
cratic procedures might be effective instrumentally in throwing the crooks
out; and opponents of the labor movement who thought that democratic
unions would be weak and ineffective. 70 This renders in most cases un-
usually hollow the search for underlying congressional intent, the method
suggested in the oft-repeated admonition of Professor Cox.71 Interpreting
the LMRDA requires more than congressional intent in this sense. There is
also much to be gained from study of the investigatory record which
preceded legislation, and from study of the statutory text itself.
The statutory text does not, unsurprisingly, resolve the issue of coverage
for Canadian unionists. They can presumably sue their international. The
substantive provisions of Title I grant rights to "members" or "every
member of a labor organization." 72 The Canadian teamster or electrician is
68. See SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER AcTivms IN THE LABOR OR MANAGMENT FIELD, INTERIM
REP., S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER AcrIvIES IN THE
LABOR OR MANAGMENT FIELD, SECOND INTERIM REP., S. REP. No. 621, 86th cong., Ist Sess. (1959);
SELECT COMM. IMPROPER Acnvrrs IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, FINAL REP., S. REP. No.
1139,86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); see alsoHearingsonlmproperActivities in the Labor orManagment
FieldBefore the Select Comm. onImproperActivities in the Labor orManagment Field, 85th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1957); 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960)
(involving over 1500 witnesses and generating 46,000 pages of testimony).
69. Summers, supra note 63, at 274.
70. A. McADAMS, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLAnION (1964) reviews the political history
of the legislation. See also Summers, The Political Miracle, in C. SUMMERS, J. RAUH & H. BENSON,
UNION DEMOCRACY AND LANDRUM-GRIFFIN 1 (1986).
71. "[B]ecause much of the bill was written on the floor of the Senate or House of Representatives
and because many sections contain calculated ambiguities or political compromises. . . . the courts
would be well advised to seek out the underlying rationale without placing great emphasis upon close
construction of the words." Cox, supra note 63, at 852. Cox played a leading role in shaping the
legislation, and may be confident of his underlying rationale, but his underlying rationale was not
shared by everyone, and no other underlying rationale was either.
There is no question that the bill is poorly drafted. Title I, the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor
Organizations, with which this article is primarily concerned, appeared as an amendment on the floor of
the Senate, without benefit of committee study; the only relevant legislative aids to interpretation are the
Senate debate, which anticipated few of the relevant problems, and the remarks of the subsequent
conference committee which kept the title in the Act. The title consists of a series of broadly stated
rights, nearly every one then qualified by a proviso which, if read broadly enough, could obliterate the
right.
72. LMRDA § 101(a)(l)-(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1)-(5) (1982).
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a member of the international union, and that union is unquestionably a
"labor organization. ", 73 The Canadian may also sue a "conference, general
committee, joint or system board, or joint council" subordinate to the
international of which he is a member. 74
Is a Canadian local of the Teamsters, Steelworkers, or IBEW a "labor
organization" under the LMRDA? The statute permits two plausible an-
swers: (1) Yes, if any of its members works for an employer who is also an
"employer" for purposes of United States labor law; or (2) No, not at all.
The argument for the former reading, that is, that some but not all
Canadian locals are United States statutory "labor organizations," is
strictly textual. First, the definition of "labor organization" under the
LMRDA is intentionally broader than that under the National Labor Rela-
tions (Wagner) Act. 75 Second, the Canadian local is a "labor organization"
if membership in it may be enjoyed by "employees." 76 Third, an "em-
ployee" is "any individual employed by an employer." 77 Fourth, an em-
ployer at least includes American corporations in domestic United States
commerce or engaged in United States-Canadian trade.78 The result of this
chain of textual references is that a Canadian local enrolling as a member
any United States statutory "employees," such as employees of United
States corporations, or truck drivers hauling between United States and
Canadian cities, would be governed by the LMRDA as to relations with all
of its members including those who are not statutory "employees." This is
the test used to apply the LMRDA to some United States locals consisting
largely (but not entirely) of public employees.7 9
While this resolution cannot be ruled out, it seems haphazard at the least,
subjecting an almost arbitrarily selected set of Canadian locals to two
different bodies of law. In my view, examining Congress' understanding of
73. LMRDA § 3(j)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 402 0)(2) (1982).
74. LMRDA § 3(j)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 403(j)(5) (1982). There may be problems obtaining personal
jurisdiction of a Canadian conference or council if it is relatively autonomous. If merely an admin-
istrative arm of the international, it might be sued in the district holding international headquarters.
75. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982). The LMRDA definition includes unions represent-
ing individuals under the Railway Labor Act, agricultural employees, and some public employees. S.
REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1959).
76. That is, it is "chartered by a labor organization [the international] .. .as the local or
subordinate body through which such employees may enjoy membership. LMRDA § 3(j)(4),
29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(4) (1982).
77. LMRDA § 3(f), 29 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1982).
78. "Employer" is defined in section 3(e) and must be "engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce." "Affecting commerce," helpfully enough, "means ... in commerce," § 3(c), and "com-
merce" includes trade and the like "between any State and any place outside thereof." LMRDA § 3(a),
29 U.S.C. § 402 (1982).
79. See, e.g., Black v. Transport Workers, 454 F. Supp. 813, 821 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 594
F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1978). Professor Michael Goldberg urged both this statutory reading, and the analogy
to public employee locals, on me.
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the institution of international unionism leads rather to the conclusion that
the LMRDA must be applied to the Canadian activities of the international
union, but that this application to internationals would obviate any direct
regulation of Canadian locals.
Congress may not have addressed, or even thought about, the problem of
Canadian LMRDA plaintiffs. Nevertheless, it was well aware that the
institutions on whose regulation it was embarking-the international
unions-were indeed international organizations, whose international
character created problems for law enforcement. Senate investigators on
the trail of large amounts of cash removed from the treasury of the United
Textile Workers (AFL) and apparently used to purchase and furnish the
private homes of the president and secretary-treasurer encountered the
union's extraordinary defense that the cash was used to hire strongmen to
keep alleged communists out of Canadian plants. 80 The chairman of the
Western Conference of Teamsters, whose jurisdiction included three Cana-
dian provinces and eleven western states, told of using $400,000 in mem-
bers' dues to purchase stock in a Canadian trucking company which was
then turned over to an employer friend.81 Antidemocracy, like corruption,
did not respect boundaries. The Bakery and Confectionary Workers
rammed antidemocratic constitutional amendments through a "controlled"
convention; the "controlled" locals included Canadian as well as United
States locals. 82
The LMRDA was enacted in order to give union members legal remedies
against corruption or authoritarianism of this kind. Following the adoption
of the legislation, afn AFL textile worker in Virginia or a teamster in Oregon
could sue the union officials to remedy their breach of their fiduciary
obligations.8 3 It seems obvious that if Congress had thought about Cana-
dian workers, equally victimized by these American union leaders, it
would have seen no difficulty in a suit in federal court by those workers as
well.
For better or worse, the rights in the LMRDA were not granted to union
members as a reward for them personally, as a subsidy or political favor to
unionists. The entire focus of the investigations and legislative debate was
on the unions as institutions, the corruption of some leaders, and the need
for tools to clean up the unions. Quite certainly, if the 1959 Congress had
80. Hearings on Investigation of Improper Activities in the Labor or Managment Field Before the
Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3294-303 (1957) (testimony of Lloyd Klenert). See also id. at 3503-04.
81. Id. at 1306-26 (testimony of Frank Brewster). At the time of the hearing, the money had not
been repaid.
82. Id. at 2796-801.
83. LMRDA § 501(b), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982).
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been asked: "Are you providing benefits for Canadian unionists?", its
answer would have been that this was far from its concern. This is not the
right question, however. The question is rather: "When a union governed
by the LMRDA behaves improperly, may union members harmed by the
action sue to put a stop to it?" The instrumental quality of LMRDA suits-
their perceived value to regulate an American institution-compels the
conclusion that the nationality of the plaintiff was irrelevant to Congress.
This has been the consistent interpretation by the Department of Labor of
those titles of the LMRDA for which it has enforcement responsibility. In
its earliest regulations interpreting the Act, the Department provided that
the imposition of a trusteeship on a Canadian local by a United States
national or international union is subject to Title III of the LMRDA. 84
Similarly, elections for national or international officers including Cana-
dian and American voters must be conducted in compliance with the
LMRDA. 85 The Department disclaims any application of the Act directly
to Canadian locals. 86 These provisions have been the Department's consis-
tent policy since the enactment of the statute.
84. 29 C.F.R. § 451.6(c) (1984). So far as I can determine, the Department has never taken action
against an international union for imposing a trusteeship on a Canadian local.
Trusteeships not in compliance with Title III, that is, established for an improper purpose or subject
to the political or financial manipulation of international officers, may be the subject of a lawsuit by
either the Secretary of Labor or a member or subordinate body of the labor organization. LMRDA
§ 304(a), 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1982). Presumably this possibility of individual suits remains live if the
trusteeship complained of is over a foreign local, particularly in light of the Department's historic lack
of interest in Title III suits. See D. MCLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND
UNION DEMOCRACY 139-43 (1979) (Department brought five suits to terminate trusteeships during first
15 years of Act).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 451.6(b) (1984). The Department has not had an easy time enforcing this
regulation. Canada has no machinery in place for investigating union elections. Nor would Canada
allow American investigators to follow up reports of improper conduct in either the Mineworkers
election of 1972 or the Steelworkers elections of 1965 and 1977 since the Canadian government does not
accept the United States Department of Labor's assertion that international elections must follow
LMRDA standards as to the Canadian ballots as well. In 1965, the United States Department of Labor
avoided confrontation by concluding that the electioneering by the Canadian director involved negligi-
ble amounts of union money and could not have affected the election. J. HERLING, RIGHT TO CHAL-
LENGE: PEOPLE AND POWER IN THE STEELWORKERS UNION 284-85 (1972). In 1972 and 1977, the Canadian
Ministry of Labour appointed its own board of inquiry-a fairly extraordinary move in Canadian labor
law-to investigate alleged misconduct. In 1977, the board was headed by a former judge and active
arbitrator, frequently under steel contracts, who was regarded by dissidents as favorable to the union
victors. While no one has accused him of any improprieties in his investigation, United States
Department of Labor officials who have spoken with me privately have suggested that the appointment
of an individual with his background displayed a certain lack of sensitivity to the seriousness with which
the Americans regarded the charges respecting Canadian ballot handling. His report was finally
submitted to the Department almost nine months after the election and two months after the time would
normally have expired for the Department to file suit, time extended only by gracious waivers from the
union. Ultimately the Department decided not to challenge the 1977 election. See Sadlowski v.
Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 858 (D.D.C. 1979).
86. 29 C.F.R. § 451.6(a) (1984).
1034
Canadian Members of International Unions
IV. APPLYING THE STANDARD
We turn now to three standard hypothetical suits under the LMRDA: (a) a
Canadian unionist sues her own local in a United States district court,
complaining of their discipline of her or actions towards her; (b) she sues
the international, complaining of the local's actions; and (c) she sues the
international, complaining of its own actions, such as affirming the local's
discipline. The first two suits are problematic, either as a matter of personal
jurisdiction or substantive labor law. The third suit presents no serious
problems and should be entertained by the federal court.
A. Suit Against the Canadian Local
A suit in United States federal court by a Canadian unionist against the
Canadian local of an American-based international presents such knotty
interpretative problems under the LMRDA that it is hard to conclude that
Congress intended the effort. One, already mentioned, is the difficult
question of whether the Canadian local is a "labor organization" within the
meaning of the statute. 87 A second, even more serious, is the problem of
jurisidiction: suit must be brought in the district where the alleged violation
occurred or where the labor organization has its principal office. 88 Neither
seems to comprehend a suit against a Canadian local. Consequently, the
relationship between a Canadian member of an international union and her
local would seem to be governed by Canadian law.89
B. Suit Against the International, Complaining of the Local's
Discipline
Suppose the Canadian unionist, disciplined by her local for free speech
or under improper procedure, does not appeal the discipline within the
union, but instead sues the international under the LMRDA. 90 This suit
87. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
88. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
89. Query however the interesting possibility that the Canadian court might elect to sharpen the
content of the vague "natural justice" standard, in the case of the local of a United States-based
international, by recourse to the law under the LMRDA, either as an analogy or under its own choice of
law rules. See supra note 5.
90. The LMRDA does not require exhaustion of internal union remedies, nor may unions bind their
members directly or indirectly to mandatory exhaustion. The district court hearing the Title I suit may in
its discretion require plaintiff to await four months of internal union processes. LMRDA § 101(a)(4),29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1982). See NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, 391
U.S. 418 (1968); Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 628 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083
(1981); Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1962).
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presents substantive questions under the LMRDA of an international's
liability for acts taken at a local level. Authority is divided, but under the
more recent cases such a suit will be unsuccessful.
It is necessary to distinguish two separate theories of the international's
liability. One is agency; the local might be treated as the agent of the
international. A distinct theory is international liability because of its own
obligations under the LMRDA, which might, entirely apart from agency
questions, be defined so as to include duties of supervision or correction of
local unions. The cases properly treat the theories separately but invariably
and improperly reach a like result in each.
The LMRDA does not discuss agency liability. Consequently, some
standard of agency must be borrowed from some other source or con-
cocted. Currently three such theories compete. The most expansive asser-
tedly applies common law to find the local to be the agent of the interna-
tional, making the international liable under respondeat superior for torts
committed by the local in the scope of its authority. 91 The most restricted is
the agency standard of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 92 However, the interna-
tionals who have argued for the application of the latter standard under the
LMRDA have been uniformly unsuccessful. 93 The intermediate standard is
the so-called common law agency standard of the Labor-Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 94 which has recently been applied to an
LMRDA case in what appears to be an influential opinion. 95 Under this
standard, an international is not normally liable for discipline carried out
entirely at the local level.
91. Allen v. International Alliance of Theatrical, Stage Employees & Moving Picture Machine
Operators, 338 F.2d 309, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1964) (Wisdom, J.). The statement in the text is, strictly
speaking, an alternative ground for the holding, since the international was also found liable on the basis
of its participation in the local's actions. Id. at 317. Moreover, the case does not appear to have been
cited for its agency holding.
92. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (requiring "clear proof of actual participa-
tion in, or actual authorization of, such acts [of agents] or of ratification of such acts after actual
knowledge thereof.").
93. Aguirre v. Automotive Teamsters, 633 F.2d 168, 170-74 (9th Cir. 1980); Shimman v. Frank,
625 F.2d 80, 95 n.26 (6th Cir. 1980).
94. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(e), 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1982) (provid-
ing in terms only that actual authorization or subsequent ratification are not necessary conditions to a
finding of agency). The Supreme Court's authoritative construction of this section found it to have
adopted a common law agency standard. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 216
(1979).
95. Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 95 n.26, reh'g denied, 633 F.2d 468 (6th Cir. 1980)
(international liable only if it authorizes, supports, commands, or requires action, or if international
controls local). Shimman has been followed in Crouch v. Mo-Kan Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740 F.2d
805, 810 (10th Cir. 1984); Urichuck v. Clark, 689 F.2d 40,43 (3d Cir. 1982); and Aguirre v. Automotive
Teamsters, 633 F.2d 168, 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
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A more interesting question, in my view, is whether the international
union's own duties under the LMRDA, to secure the rights of members
under the bill of rights, include duties to supervise, control, or correct
lapses of democracy at the local level.96 It is not difficult to imagine such a
duty in the international although there are obstacles to its creation.
Certainly Congress regarded the restoration of democratic procedures as a
permissible reason for an international to step into a local, 97 but this does
not mean that Congress regarded it as a neglect of duty for an international
not to step in under those circumstances. Some commentators see the
trusteeship title in particular as supporting a policy of "local autonomy;"
under this view courts should hesitate to construe Title I so as to create any
duties in the international to supervise and control locals. The analogous
provision of the United States Constitution, requiring states to observe a
republican form of government, has not been doctrinally fruitful or read as
imposing any particular duties of supervision or control on the national
government. 98
Discussion of any such affirmative duty of supervision under the
LMRDA must remain theoretical for the present. Two courts of appeal have
recently held on the facts presented that no such duty exists. 99 While this
still leaves room for the evolution of some sort of duty of supervision in the
international, it requires no genius to predict that the courts are more likely
96. I assume that the rights in the bill of rights are Hohfeldian "rights" which imply correlative
"duties" in the union.
97. LMRDA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1982).
98. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. See Bakery. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217-29 (1962); Pacific States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 139-51 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). See
generally W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OFTHE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972).
99. Chapa v. Local 18, 737 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1984) (no duty in international union to
prevent allegedly unfair disciplinary proceedings, despite attendance of its representative at local
meetings); Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 99 (6th Cir. 1980) (no duty in international to prevent
beating of dissidents by thugs directed by district representative). Both cases reach this result through
an unsound analogy. In Carbon Fuel v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 217-18 (1979), a case
under the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, the Supreme Court discussed and rejected
the notion of an international union's duty to supervise or control wildcat strikes by locals. The Court
did hold, in that case, that the international's liability as a principal and its supervisory liability should
be coextensive. Id. This was true, however, because there was literally no basis at all for imputing
supervisory responsibilities to the international except by implication from Congress' support for
arbitration. Id. at 218. No statute even arguably created such liability and, the Court held later in the
opinion, no contract did either. Id. By examining what Congress had done on agency liability, the Court
could reject the employer's claim that the statute implicity created supervisory liability.
By contrast, under the LMRDA, the international's supervisory obligations, whatever they are, do
not rest on some vague liability imputed from its liability as a principal. The international union has
obligations directly under the LMDRA to avoid infringing the rights secured to union members, such as
free speech and assembly. Whether the international's obligations include duties of supervision and
control of locals is a question of the substantive interpretation of the LMRDA, not a question of agency.
This is particularly true since, as we have noted, Congress did not even discuss the appropriate agency
standard under the LMRDA and the question of agency standard has divided the circuits.
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to develop this duty in the first instance in cases alleging a duty to supervise
a United States-based local. Consequently, for the foreseeable future, a
Canadian unionist who does not appeal local discipline will probably not
be able successfully to sue an international union not directly involved in
the discipline.
C. Suit Against the International, After It Affirms Local Discipline
The topic of this article comes into play once the Canadian unionist has
appealed her discipline to the international and the latter has affirmed the
discipline. On such affirmance the international normally has committed a
separate violation of the LMRDA in its own right and may be sued in order
to remedy the violation. 100
This article has argued that there are no obstacles in international law or
comity to such a suit. The violation is by an unquestioned labor organiza-
tion, being sued in the federal district where it has its headquarters. The
violation complained of, that is, the affirmance of the discipline, occurred
in the United States. Plaintiff is a member of the affected labor organiza-
tion. There would normally be no conflict with the law of other nations. 101
It would be the international union, not the plaintiff, which would raise
issues of international law and comity, by means of a motion to dismiss.
This article has attempted to show why such a motion should not be
granted. First, under some approaches with academic support and judicial
application (the Jones Act cases), there is present a choice of law question
but not a jurisdictional question. The court must decide whether Canadian
or American law governs the relationship between the unionist and the
international union, although it need make that decision only if there is a
true conflict between the two systems. Secondly, if the court decided that
there is a serious question about its jurisdiction, it must answer that
question on the basis of Congress' will, since if Congress intended the case
to be heard, the court must do so. I have tried to show that "Congress'
intent" respecting the application of the LMRDA to Canadian members
will involve the court's empathetic identification with the concerns and
values of the 1959 Congress. I have also tried to show that Congress was
100. Petramale v. Local 17, Laborers Int'l Union, 736 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
593 (1984). A recent district court case explains the rationale: if the member's appeal puts the
international on notice of the local's violations, then affirmance by the international constitutes a
ratification. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95. Laborers Int'l Union, 624 F. Supp. 678,685
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying international's motion for summary judgment).
101. Potential conflicts, if any, between the international's obligations under Canadian and United
States law could be dealt with if and when they arise. I have been unable to think of any circumstance in
which the LMRDA would require an international union to do something which Canadian labor law
would forbid. Obviously my knowledge of Canadian labor law is limited.
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aware of the international activities of some of the corrupt internationals of
greatest concern to it, and that, had it considered the question whether such
corruption or authoritarianism should be remedied if visited on Canadian
members, would probably have answered yes. Finally, I have shown that
ample precedent exists for the application of a federal statute on behalf of a
foreign plaintiff victimized by an American violation, on the theory that
American courts may regulate either American nationals, or American
conduct, or conduct with domestic effects.
V. CONCLUSION
Canadian members of United States-based international unions acquire
rights against their international under Titles I, Il, IV, and V of the
LMRDA. Once the international acts to affirm discipline imposed on an
improper basis, or through improper procedures, the Canadian unionist
may sue to remedy the violation in the United States district court where the
international has its headquarters. The Canadian unionist's relations with
her local, on the other hand, are governed either principally or exclusively
by Canadian common law.
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